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FREDToYOSAilURO KoREMA.TBU,
v.

PETITIONER

THE UNITED STATES OF AMEruoA

ON WRIT OF OERTIORARI TO TRB UNITBD STATES OIROUIT
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH OIROUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STAT.ES

OPINIONS

BELOW

The opinion of the court below and the two
concurring opinions (R. 33-54) are reported at 140
F. (2d) 289. There was no opinion by the trial
court. The opinion of this Court that petitioner's·
suspended sentence was an appealable judgment
is reported at 319 U. S. 432.

l

. JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals
was entered on December 2, 1943 (R. 33). The
petition for a writ of certiorari was filed on FebU>

I
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED

L

1. Whether Executive Order No. 9066 (7 F. R.
1407) and the Act of March 21, 1942, 56 Stat.
173 (18 U. S. C., Supp. III, Sec. 97a) authorized
the provision of Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34
, (7 F. R. 3967), which prohibited the presence of
persons of Japanese ancesti-y in a designated
area after a specified date.
• 2. Whether the provision of Civilian Exclusion
Order No. 34, which prohibited the presence of
persons of Japanese ancestry in a designated area
after a specified date, was constitutional.
3. Whether petitioner has standing to raise
any question as to the detention to which he
would have been subjected if he had reported for
evacuation in accordance with the terms of Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34.
•
4. If petitioner does have standing to raise an
issue with regard to such detention, whether the
detention would have been lawful.
STATUTES,

ORDERS, AND PROCLAMATIONS

INVOLVED

Civilian Exclusion Order .No. 34, issued by
tieutenant General John L. DeWitt on May 3,
1942, was promulgated in accordance with his
Public Proclamation No. 1, issued on March 2,

1942 (7 F. R. 2320); and both the Order and the
Proclamation were promulgated under the authority granted by Executive Order No. 9066 and
the Act of March 21, 1942. A summary of the
content of these documents follows at pp. 6-9;
a more detailed statement is given in Appendix I,
infra, at pp. 60-75, and the documents themselves
are set forth in Appendix II at pp. 76-78, 79-97.
STATEMENT

1. PETITIONER'S VIOLATION OF THE EXCLUSION ORDER

.An information (R. 1), filed in the District
Court for the Northern District of California on
June 12, 1942, charged the petitioner, a person of
,Japanese ancestry, with having knowingly remained, on or about May 30, 1942, in that portion
of Military Area· No. 1 established by Public
Proclamation No. 1 of March 2, 1942, including
the City of San Leandro, Alameda County, California, from which all such persons had been ordered excluded after May 9, 1942, by Civilian
Exclusion Order No. 34 of May 3, 1942, issued
by Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt, Commanding General of the Western Defense Command, pursuant to Executive Order No. 9066 of
February 19, 1942, and authority from the Secretary of W ar.1
The information consequently charged violation of the
Act of March 21, 1942 (18 U. S. C., Supp. Ill, Sec. 97a),
which was mentioned in the caption but not in the body of
the information (R 1).
1

~~~~-
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ruary 8, 1944 (R. 66) and was granted March
27, 1944 (R. 65). The jurisdiction of this Court
rests on Section 240 (a) of the Judicial Code as
amended by the Act of February 13, 1925.

4

L

5

,.,M<''.·•~

in the war against Japan (R. 24). He has been
a

registeredvoter in Alameda County since attaining
the age of 21 years (R. 24). The remainder of his
testimonyalso tended to show his lack of sympathy
with Japan· and his assimilation in the American
r.ommunity(R. 24-25). The evidence introduced
by the United States showed that the petitioner
bad continued to work and live in Alameda County
after May 9 because of friendly 1·elations with its
residents, and particularly with a girl who was
not of Japanese ancestry, and because he considered himself an American and did not want to
be evacuated (R. 20-22).
The petitioner was convicted (R. 25) and thereafter his motion in arrest of judgment was'denied
and the court sentenced him to a five-year perio
d
of probation (R. 26) ; the judgment was entered
September 8, 1942, the day of the trial (R. 26). On
appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals, that court
certifiedthe question whether the judgment was an
appealable one. After this Court's decision (319
U. S. 432) in the affirmative, the Circuit Court of
Appeals, sitting en. bane, unanimously affirmed the
conviction,two judges delivering concurring opinions (R. 33-64).
2. THE EXCLUBION'pRQORA.M

The issues raised by petitioner extend to various·
aspects of the exclusion program of which Civilian
Exclusion Order No. 34 (in.fra, pp. 88-89), which
petitioner violated, was a part. The details of

Reproduced at the National Archives at Seattle

A demurrer to the information (R. 2-13) and
a supplement to the demurrer (R. 13-14) wero
overruled on August 31, 1942 (R. 14-16), and an
exception was taken. On September 8, 1942, the
petitioner appeared in the trial court in the custody of the military authorities and with his attorneys, pleaded not guilty, waived tl'.ial by jury, and
proceeded to trial (R. 15). It was stipulated on
the record that the petitioner is a native-born citizen of the United States, born in Oakland, Alameda
County, California, on June 30, 1919, to Japanese
nationals resident there (R. 19); and that at the
time of his arrest. on May 30, 1942, the petitioner
was in the City of San Leandro, Alameda County,
California, within the area from which he knew
that he, as a person of Japanese ancestry, had been
ordered excluded by General DeWitt's Public Proclamation No. 1 and Civilian Excllli3ion
Order No. 34 (R. 19).
Petitioner's testimony, which was not controverted, showed that he has never renounced his
American citizenship; that he has never departed
from the continental limits of the United States;
that his birth has not, with either his consent or
knowledge, been registered with any consul of the
Empire of Japan; and that he does not possess
any f01m of dual allegiance and does not owe
allegiance to ·any country other than the United
States (R. 24). He registered for the draft and
testified that he is willing to bear arms for this
country and to render any service requested of him

~

I

that program are set forth in Ap
pen(iix I, infra.
:l'hey win be summarized here
and this summary
)Vill bo followed by a
brief statement with regard
to the reasons for the program.
A, CIVILIAN EXCLUSION ORD
ERS

·-

l_

..,}I:

.. Civilian Exclusion Order No.
34 of May 3, 19-12,
was one of a series of 108 such
orders issued by
Lieutenant General John L. DeWi
tt, Commanding
General of the Western Defense
Command, to accomplish the removal of all per
sons of Japanese
f1ncestry from Military Area No
. 1 and a portion
of Military Area No. 2, embracin
g the West Coast
area composed of the State of
California, the
western portions of O1·egonand
Washington, and
the southern portion of Arizon
a (infra, p. 60).
These orders, each of which app
lied to a defined
locality or tenito1y of limited
size, were issued
during a period commencing Ma
rch 24, 1942 and
extending to July 22, 1942 (inf
ra, p. 64). They
were authorized under a delega
tion of power to
General DeWitt from the Secreta
ry of War (infra,
p. 60) pursuant to Executive Ord
er No. 9066 of
February 19, 1942, which author
ized the establishment of military areas from wh
ich "any or all
persons may be excluded" and
with respect to
which the right to enter, remain
, or leave might be
subjected to restrictions. The
Executive Order
was ratified and violation of the
regulations issued
pursuant to it was made a mis
demeanor by the
Act of March 21, 1942 (infra, pp.
60-61).

,,:11-1)·-

, ...... ·----

7

The Exclusion Orders were for
eshadowed by
General DeWitt's Public Procla
mation No. 1,
issued on March 2, 1942 (infra, pp.
79-82), which
tated that "such persons or classe
8
s of persons as
the situation may require" would
by subsequent
orders "be excluded" from the coa
stal area. Duriug the interval between this Pro
clamation and
Public Proclamation_ No. 4 of
March 27, 1942
(infra, pp. 86-87) which for
bade persons of
Japanese ancestry to leave Milita
ry Area No. 1,
the s~lf-arranged migration of suc
h persons from
the area was encouraged and ass
isted by a Wartime Civil Control Administratio
n established by
General DeWitt (infra, pp. 6263).
Civilian. Exclusion Order No. 1
of March 24,
19-12,applicable to a small territor
y in the State
of Washington, permitted self-arra
nged migration
during the five days following its
issuance (infra,
p. 65), before its provision for the
group evacuation from the territory of person
s of Japanese
ancestry and their exclusion the
reafter from the
territory became effective; but
all of the subsequent Orders, including Order
No. 34, and the
accompanying Instructions, impose
d the requirement that all such persons retain
their previous
residences, unless individually
permitted to
change, until the dates which we
re prescribed for
their removal. After these dat
es it became an
offensefor any such person to rem
ain or be found
within the designated territory
(infra, p. 65).
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To accomplish the evacuation of persons of J apanese ancestry from each of the defined territories,
the applicable Civilian Exclusion Order and Instructions required a member of each family and
each individual living alone in the territory to report to a previously established Civil Control Office
or Station and provided that all persons of Japanese ancestry would be "evacuated" u1Jon a specified exclusion date six days after the date of the
Order (infra, p.·65). It was stated that the Civil
Control Office or Station would assist the persons
affected. In. fact, assistance was given with respect to the disposition of the property and affairs
. of these persons (infra, p. 63).
The evacuees were transported under military
control and with regard to their welfare, on the
dates their exclusion became mandatory, to previously prepared Assembly Centers not far removed, located within Military Area No. 1, where·
they were temporarily detained pending their
transfer to Relocation Centers (infra, p. 66). The
•detention of the evacuees in these Centers was required by the provisions of the Exclusion Orders
which forbade them to remain within the specified
territories following the prescribed removal dates,
except in Assembly Centers, and by General DeWitt's Civilian Restrictive Order No. 1 (infra,
pp.·93-94), issued on May 19, 1942, which required
the persons confined in Assembly Centers to stay
there unless individually permitted to leave (infra,

p. 68). The evacuees under Civilian Exclusion,
Order No. 34 were taken to the Tanforan Assembly Center in San Mateo County, California.
Civilian Exclusion Order No. 35 of May 3, 1942,
applied to that county.
D. REMOVAL FROM ASSEMBLY OENTEnS

Beginning in May, 1942, provision was made for
the temporary release of a limited number of
evacueesfrom Assembly Centers to engage in supervised agricultural work outside the evacuated
areas. A few evacuees were released in other ways.
(Infra, p. 74.) The great bulk of the evacuees in •
Assembly Centers were, however, removed during
the period between May and November, 1942, to
Relocation Centers maintained by the War Relocation Authority established by Executive Order No.
9102 of March 18, 1942 (infra, p. 74). All together, 108,503 of the 110,219 evacuees originally
transported to the Assembly Centers were so removed. All but a few of the evacuees at the 'l'anforan Assembly Center were removed to the Central Utah Relocation P1·oject in September and
October, 1942 (infra, p. 74).
Although relocation of the evacuees, which followed petitioner's arrest in point of time and was
begunafter his initial violation, is, we believe, not
in issue in this case, a few facts with regard to it
will serve to pla~e the 48sembly Center phase of
the exclusion program in its relation to subsequent
developments.

.-ii,'.:fiic.......__.
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3. REASONS :FOR THE EXCLUSION PROGRAM

The situation leading to the determination to exclude all persons of Japan~se ancestry from Military Area No. 11 and the California portion of'
Military Area No. 2 was stated in detail in the Government's brief in this Court in Hirabayashi v..
United States, No. 870, October Term, 1942, and
was reviewed in the opinion in that case, 320 U. S.
81. That statement need not be repeated here. 1
In brief, facts which were generally known in the
earlymonths of 1942 or have since been disclosed indicate that there was ample ground to believe that
imminentdanger then existed of an attack by Japan
upon the West Coast. This area contained a
large concentration of war production and war
facilities. Of the 126,947 persons of· Japanese
descent in the United States, 111,938 lived in
Military Areas No. 1 and No. 2, of whom approximately two-thirds were United States citizens.
Social, economic, and political conditions prevailTho Final Report of General DeWitt (which is dated
June 5, 1943,but which was not made public until January
IO«), hereinafter cited as Final Report, is relied on in this
brief for statistics and other details conoorning the actual
evacuationand the events thnt took pince subsequent thereto.
We have specifically recited in this brief the facts relating •
to the justification for the evacuation, of which we usk the
Court to take judicial notice, and we rely upon the Fnal,
Report only to the extent that it relates to such facts.
1
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The Relocation Centers provided more adequate
facilities and permitted greater provision for normal modes of living by evacuees than did the temporary Assembly Centers. They were intended to
serve as places of residence pending more per-•
manent relocation in communities. Persons removed to the Relocation Centers were required to
remain there by Civilian Restrictive Order No. I
( supra, p. 8), except as the War Relocation Authority might issue permits for them to leave ( infra,
p. 94). That Authority has made provision for
such permits to issue and has assisted many
evacuees to move to communities throughout the
• country east of the forbidden West Coast area.
The development and results of the Authority's
leave program and procedures are fully set forth
in the Government's brief in Ex parte Endo, No.
70 at the present Term of Court, and will not be
detailed in the present brief. Reference is made
(infra, pp. 72-73), however, to the principal regulations under which leave from the Relocation
Centers has been granted. The leave procedures
were inaugurated July 20, 1942, and had resulted
by July 29, 1944, in the 1·elocation in outside communities of 28,911 evacuees, leaving 79,686 still
resident in the Centers. Formal authority to issue
leave permits was conferred upon the War Relocation Authority by the Military Commander on
August 11, 1942 ( infra, p. 72). •

i
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ing since the immigration of the J ~panese to tho
United States were such that the assimilation of
many of them by the white community had been
prevented. There was -evidence indicating the ex.
istence of media through which Japan could have
• •attempted, and had attempted, to secure the at.
•tachment of many of these persons to the J apa.
nese Government and to arouse their sympathy and
enthusiasm for its war aims. There was a basis
for concluding that some persons of Japanese ancestry, although American citizens, had formed
an attachment to, and sympathy and enthusiasm
for, Japan. 8 It was also evident that it would be
impossible quickly and accurately to distinguish
these persons from other citizens of Japanese ancestry. The presence in Military Areas Nos. I and
2 of persons who might aid Japan was peculiarly
and particularly dangerous.
Under these circumstances the determination
was made to exclude all persons of Japanese ances•
try from Military Area No. 1 and the Cali•
fornia portion of Military Area No. 2. The persons
affected were at first encouraged and assisted to
migrate under their own arrangements, but this
• In addition to the authorities cited in the Hirabayashi
brief, see Anonymous ( An Intelligence Officer), The J apanese in America, The Problem and the Solution, Harper's
Magazine for October 1942, p. 489; the article is stated at p.
564 to have been condensed from a series of reports by an
Intelligence Officer stationed for many years on the West
Coast, whose primary duty was the study of the West Coast
residents of Japanese ancestry. See also Jssei, Nisei, Kibe4
Fortune Magazine for April, 1944 (Vol. XXIX, No. 4), p. 8.

method of securing their removal from Military
Area No.1 was terminated by Public Proclamation
No.4 (infra, pp. 86-87). The Proclamation recited
that it was necessary to restrict and regulate the
migration from that Area in order to insure the
orderly evacuation and resettlement of the persons
affected. Elsewhere the voluntary program was
stated to have broken down; and it was brought
out that greater control was necessary "to insure
an orderly.evacuation and protect the Japanese".'
The rate of self-arranged migration was inadequate, partly because of growing indications tliat
persons of Japanese ancestry proceeding to new
communitieswere likely to meet with hostility and
even violence (infra, pp. 41-43). ·The spokesmen
for one organization of persona of Japanese ancestry testified before the House of Representatives
CommitteeInvestigating National Defense Migration in February 1942, while the evacuation was
underdiscussion, that even at that time the members
of the organization feared to migrate.a The Committee during the same month requested the opinionsof the Governors of the Rocky Mountain States
with regard to the possibility of resettling Japanese
evacueesfrom the West Coast area in those States.
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' Fourth Interim, Report of the Select Oommittee lnvesti•
gating Defense Migration of the House of Representatives,
11. Rep. No. 2124, 77th Cong., 2d sess. (hereinafter cited
as Fourth Interim Report), pp. 6, 8.
'Hearings before the HOtUJeOommittee Investigating Na,.
tional Defense Migration, 77th Cong., 2d ~-, Part 29, pp.
11137,11156.
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0
Preliminary Report of the Select Committee Investigating National Defense Migration of the Hou.se of Representatives, H. Rep. No. 1911, 77th Cong., 2d ses.s.,hereinafter cited
as Preliminary Report, pp. 27-30. See also Fourth Interim
Rept'Jrt, p. 17.
1
Albuquerque Journal, May 29, 1942, p. 1.
8
SpokaM Spokesman Review, May 24, 1942, p. 7.
• Billings Gazette, April 30, 1942, p. 14.
10
Seo Final Report, p. 43.
. ·:,:,

tho war effort and provide for the welfare of the
evacuees. Tq this end, the release of each individual for 1·esettlement is conditioned upon a
determination (1)_ that bis release will not be
prejudicial to the cow1try's security and (2) that
ho will have means of support and is likely to be
acceptedby the particular community to which be
proposesto go. The first determination obviously
requires time; but its accomplishment in individual
cases has far outrun the reabsorption of the
evacuees. In relation to the second det~rmination,
expressions of hostility towards the evacuees have
continued. In the 1943 sessions of the state legislaturc;s,bills directed against persons of Japanese
ancestry were introduced in at least 11 States in
addition to the three West Coast States. The
bills sought to prohibit land ownership by persona
of Japanese ancestry ;11 to restrict business transactions with evacuees ;12 to restrict their voting
privileges;18 to revoke the citizenship of dual citizens;u to establish segregation in the schools ;16 and
to bar student evacuees.1°
u Sen. Bill 251, Alabama; Sen. Bill 250, House Bill 531,
Colorado; Sen. Bill-351, Florida; Ark. Sess. L. (1943) Act
47. Land ownership by Japanese aliens was restricted by
Ut.11..h
Sess. L. ( 1943), c. 85; Wyo. Sess. L. ( 1943), c. 35.
u Ariz. Sess. L. ( 1943), c. 89.
uwyo.Scss.L. (1943),c.27.
u Mont. Sess. L. ( 1943), p. 595.
11
Sen. Bill 103, Arkansas.
11
.Memodal of Arizona legislature; memorial of Idaho
legislature; memoriRl of Iowa legislature. Of. House Bill
!01~,P~nnsylvania, to terminate appropriations to any State
Ul8t1tutionparticipating in the relocation program.
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Twelve governors replied that local sentiment waa
opposed to any such resettlement except perhaps
•upon condition that the evacuees be isolated in
camps maintained by the Government.• AfU!r
compulsory evacuation had begun, the Governor
and .Attorney General of New Mexico opposed any
colonization in that State; T the Governor of Idaho
advocated the return of all persona of Japanese
ancestry to Japan and opposed their relocation in
that State ;8 and the Governor of Montana urged
that no land be sold or leased to the Japanese.'
The need of greater expedition and of effective
means of providing for the maintenance and welfare of the evacuees, together with a policy of
keeping local groups together so far as possible,
led to the inauguration by Public Proclamation
No. 4 of the method of controlled evacuation by
communities, followed by relocation, which involved the detention of the evacuees during it.a
effectuation. 10
The purpose and execution of the relocation
phase of the exclusion program are fully set forth
in the Government's brief in Ex parte Endo, No.
70, this Term. The objectives are to safeguard
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SUMMARY

l ..••

OF ARGUMENT

The primary question presented is whether the
provision of Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34
making it an offense for persons of Japanese ancentry to be found in the defined area after the
effective date of the order is valid. The determination of this question involves consideration of three
subsidiary questions: (1) whether the order was
within Executive Order No. 9066 and the Act
of March 21, 1942, upon which it rested; (2)
whether the evacuation from the local region of persons of Japanese ancestry, including American citizens, and their exclus~on from the West Coast
(Military Area No. 1), which the several proclamations and orders were primarily_ designed to accomplish, was a valid exercise of the war power under
the circmnstances; and (3) if, contrary to the Government's contention, the question is here in issue,
whether the detention of petitioner in connection
with the method adopted to accomplish evacuation,
to which he would have been subjected if he had
obeyed Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34, would have
been valid.
The authority for the reinoval of persons of
Japanese ancestry from the West Coast in Executive Order No. 9066 and the Act of March 21, 1942,
has been determined by this Court in Hirabayashi
v. United States, 320 U. S. 81. The exclusion
comes within the specific language of both the
Order and the Act and was within the announced

17

objectives of both at the time the Act was under
consideration. Tho Act unquestionably ratified
the Executive Order.
The removal was a valid exercise of the war
power because the military situation which this
Comi noticed in the Hirabayashi case, coupled
with the danger from a disloyal minority and the
difficultyof segregating these from other pe1·sons
of Japanese ancestry, constituted a substantial
basis for the military decision that the exclusion
was a necessary protective measure (320 U. S. at
p. 95).
Petitioner's conviction of remaining in the for- .
bidden zone raises no further issue. None other
was effectively raised in the District Court or decidedby the Circuit Court of Appeals. Petitioner
was convicted solely of remaining where he had
no right to be. If this central feature of the exclusionprogram was valid, he cannot contend that
the whole program should fail because some other
part of it was invalid. He might have challenged
the detention in an Assembly Center had he submitted to it. But, if he may so challenge it in this
case, we submit that the method of group evacua-"
tion and the detention which was a concomitant
of this method, like the exclusion itself, were
reasonable and appropriate means of carrying
forward a valid program. They constituted an
orderly method of effecting the exclusion, having
regard for both the purpose of the program and the

1
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wellbeing of the evacuees. In any event, the
detention of the evacuees as a group in Relocation
Centers is not involved in this case.
ARGUMENT

I
THE PROVISION OF CIVILIAN EXCLUSION ORDER NO. 34
WHICH PROHIBITED PETITIONER'S PRESENCE IN A
DESIGNATED AREA AFTER A SPECIFIED DATE WAS
AUTHORIZED BY EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 9066 AND
THE ACT OF MARCH 21 1 1942

Petitioner did not contend in the courts below that his exclusion from the area designated in
Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34 was outside the
authority conferred by Executive Order No. 9066
and the Act of March 21, 1942; but since the point
is raised in this Court (Pet. 25), the authority for
the Order will be briefly stated.
Executive Order No. 9066 (infra, pp. 76-78) provided that "any or all persons may be excluded"
from the duly prescribed military areas which it
authorized to be established and that with respect
to all such areas "the right of any person to enter,
remain in, or leave shall be subject to whatever
restrictions the Secretary of War or the appropriate Military Commander may impose in his
The Civilian Exclusion Order is
discretion.''
directly within the terms of these provisions. .AB
this Court noted in the H irabayashi opinion (320
U. S. at pp. 92, 103), the authority conferred by

19

the Executive Order was expressed in its preamble to be for the purpose of preventing espionage and sabotage. Public Proclamation No. 1
(infra, p. 80), to which the Civilian Exclusion
Order refers, states that "the entire Pacific Coast
• • • • is subject to espionage and acts of sabotage, thereby requiring the adoption of military
measuresnecessary to establish safeguards against
such enemy operations." The facts which rendered this-finding a .reasonable one have already
been referred to. (Supra, p. 11.) See also the
Government's brief and this Court's opinion in the
II irahayashi case.• The Executive Order followed
closelyboth in time and content the recommendation of General DeWitt to the Secretary of War
and the recommendation to the President by members of Congress, that military authority be used
to effect. the evacuation of persons of Japanese
11
There is
ancestry from the Pacific Coast states.
accordinglyno room for doubt that the evacuation
of these persons was specifically contemplated.
Since exclusion was within the authority of
Executive Order No. 9066, it was also authorized
by Congress. This Court determined in the H irabayashi case "that Congress, by the Act of March
21, 1942, ratified and confirmed Executive Order
No. 9066." 320 U. S. at p. 91. It follows
that Congress intended to authorize the pron Final Report of General DeWitt, p. 33; Preliminary
Report, pp. 3-5.
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Cl

mulgation of any order that was within the
scope of the Executive Order. • Furthermore,
the legislative history of the Act of March 21,
1942, shows that Congress specifically intended to
authorize orders excluding persons of J apa_nese
ancestry, both American citizens and ,aliens, from
the West Coast Military Areas. Hirabayashi v.
United States, at p. 91; S. Rep. 1171, 77th Cong.,
2d sess., p. 2 ; ,H. Rep. 1906, 77th Cong., 2d
sess., p. 2; 88 Cong. Rec. 2722-2726.

The pertinent. circumstances were in large part
the same as those which rendered appropriate the
imposition of the curfew. The initiation of the
exclusionprogram by the promulgation of the first
Civilian Exclusion Order occurred on the same
dute as the curfew proclamation, and the violation
by the petitioner herein occurred during the same
mouth as Hirabayashi's violation. With respect
to the conditions then prevailing this Court has
said (320 U. S. at' pp. 94, 96, 99) :
* * * That reasonably prudent
men
charged with the responsibility of our national defense had ample ground for concluding that they must face the danger of
invasion, take measures against it, and in
making the choice of measures consider our
internal situation, cannot be doubted

C,

-C

M

II
IT WAS CONSTITUTIONAL FOR CIVlLIAN EXCLUSION
ORDER NO. 3 4 TO PROHIBIT THE PRESENCE OF PER•
SONS OF JAPANESE ANCES'l'RY IN '.l'HE DESIGNATED
AREA AF'l'ER A SPECIFIED DATE

1. The Order was a valid exercise of the

=1

war
power.-This Court ruled in the H irabayashi case
that the joint war power of the President and the
Congress is sufficiently broad to cover a measure
which there is "any substantial basis" to conclude
is "a protective measure necessa1·y to meet the
threat of sabotage and espionage which would
substantially affect the war effort and which might
reasonably be expected to aid a threatened enemy
invasion." 320 U. S. at p. 95. We submit that
there was a substanti~l basis for concluding that
the Exclusion Order, equally with the curfew
which was sustained in the H irabayashi case,was
such a necessary protective measure.

*

*

*

*

*

* The German invasion of the
Western European countries had given
ample 'W:::!,rning
to the world of the menace
of the "fifth column." Espionage by persons in sympathy with the Japanese Government had been found to have been particularly effective in the surprise attack on
Pearl Harbor. At a time of threatened
Japanese attack upon this country, the
nature of our inhabitants' attachments to
-the Japanese enemy was consequently a
matter of grave conce1n.
*

*

*

*

*

*

*

* * * Whatever views we may entertain regarding the _loyalty to this country of
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the citizens of Japanese ahcestry, we cannot reject as unfounded the judgment of
the military authorities and of Congres.5
that there were disloyal members of that
population, whose number and strength
could not be precisely and quickly ascertained. We cannot say that the war-making branches of the Govermnent did not
have ground for believing that in a critical
hour such persons could not readily be isolated and separately dealt with, and constituted a menace to the national defense
and safety, which demanded that prompt
and adequate measID·es be taken to guard
against it. [Court's footnote omitted.]
The concurring Justices indicated no differenceof •
view with respect to thef)e justifications for the
curfew.
The appropriateness of the exclusion rests on
the additional fact that the danger to be apprehended from any disloyal members of the population of Japanese ancestry would remain great
if such persons should continue to reside on the
West Coast. It is obvious that the opportunity for
espionage and sabotage, as· well as the aid .to be derived therefrom by the enemy, would be greatest in
the region most exposed to the striking power of
Japan. The curfew was a method which dealt only
partially with the danger, while the exclusion
removed the danger during all hours and without
resort to the impossible task of individual surveillance. A group of over l~0,000 persons was in•

volved,in which the number and identity of the
possible disloyal members were not lruown. Prevention of acts of espionage and sabotage through
1mrvcillance obviously was fraught
with extreme
difficulty,if not wholly impossible.
On the basis of pertinent data a judgment to resort to exclusion was made by those responsible for
military and protective measures. Differences of
opinionas to the correctness·of that judgment cannot take frorri it the substantial basis upon which it
rested.
In the court below petitioner argues, as he does
hero (Pet. 7), that his exclusion was nevertheless
a violation of the due process clause of the Fifth
.Amendment. His argument appears to be based
partially upon the proposition that, aside from
the racial discrimination involved in the exclusion
measure, it is an unreasonable method of preventing espionage or sabotage to exclude from
a substantial portion of the country any la1·ge
group of residents because of apprehension.
that a minority of them might engage in disloyal acts. It is true that the prohibition of
residence of a group of persons in an area in
which they have established homes, relationships,
employment, and business enterprises, is a more
stringent deprivation to the persons affected than
the curfew involved in the Hirabayashi case,
or than the establishment of fire lines during a
fire and the confinement of people to their homes

.-,~o::n~~-;
...,~ ...

Reproduced at the National Archives at Seattle

"" '. ~ :T:. !:

I

'

• I

-~

1•

l

...
...

::c
::c

24

---

25

during an air raid alarm, which this Court citedin
sustaining the curfew. 320 U.S. at p. 99. Nevertheless, in view of the overwhelming importance
of securing the country against invasion and the
undoubted assistance which could 'be rendered to
an invading enemy by persons within the com'
munity, the exclusion of loyal persons along
with
the disloyal is not an unreasonable infringement
of liberty or a denial of due process where, as
here, there were strong grounds to believe that
the identity of the disloyal persons could not be
readily ascertained and that invasion was threatened. It is to be noted that there is no implication in either the majority or the concurring
opinion in the Hirahayashi case that the exclusion
orders might be a violation of due process.
Measures coming within the war power do not
violate the Fifth Amendment, whether or not they
could be sustained in normal times, although that
Amendment must be considered in determining the
validity of a particular exercise of the war power
•
under the· circumstances which evoke it. .Asis true
with respect to other goverll-lllental powers the liinitations imposed by due process upon the war
power mark the boundaries of the power itself.
Cf. Mott, Due Process of Law (1926), cc. XVII,
XVIII. To call in question the exclusion progl'am
under the Fifth Amendment is, therefore, to challenge in another way the sufficiency of the war
power to support the action taken by the President
and Congress and by the military authorities.

This Court has made clear the great scope of
the war power and that the limitations imposed
by due process of law permit the exercise of a
correspondinglywide discretion.
,
* * * the Congress and the President
exert the war power of the nation, and they
have wide discretion as to the means to be
employed successfully to carry on. * * •
The measures here challenged are supported
by a strong presumption of validity * * *
.Asapplied * * *, the statute and executive orders were not so clearly unreasonable
and arbitrary as to require them to be held
repugnant to the due process clause of the
Fifth Amendment. Highland v. Russell
Car Co.~279 U.S. 253,262.
In the Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U. S. 366,
the Court, although it did not refer specifically to
the Fifth Amendment, denied the limiting effect
()f several other Constitutional provisions with
re8pectto the power of Congress to require military
service, with all of its sacrifices on the part of
individuals who are drafted. 245 U. S. 389-390.
As was said in the H irabayaslii case, if an order
"was an appropriate exercise of the war power 'its
validity is not impaired because it has restricted
the citizen's liberty." 320 U. S. at p. 99. The
Fifth Amendment protects the individual from
arbitrary deprivations in war as in peace; but it
does not invalidate measures, however extreme,
whichrespond reasonably t'o the necessities of war ..
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The fact that the exclusion measure adopted
was directed only against persons of one race
does not invalidate it under the circumstances surrounding its adoption.
Persons of Japanese
ancestry were not ma1·ked out for separate treatment because Qf their race but because other considerations made the ethnic factor relevant. As
this Court noted in the Hirabayashi case (at
.P· 101):

l

The fact alone that attack on our shores
was threatened by Japan rather than
another enemy power set these citizellil
apart from others who have no particular
associations with Japan.
* * * We cannot close our eyes to
the fact, demonstrated by experience, that
in time of wa:r;residents having ethnic affiliations with an invading enemy may be
a greater source of danger than those of
a different ancestry .
Certainly the proportion of persons who might
rende:r aid to the enemy in the event of a J apanese invasion was reasonably thought to be greater
in the West Ooast population of Japanese ancestry than in the . West Coast population as a
whole or in groups of other ancestries living in
that ar~m at the time the Exclusion Order was
issued. The bases for this conclusion have already
been fully stated by this Court. Hirabq,yashi v.

27

2. The Act of March 21, 1942, did not contain an,
unconstitutional,delegation of legislative power to
orderthe exclu.sion.-On this point again the Hira- .••
bayashicase is controlling. This Court there noted
that the exclusion Order, like the curfew, was specificallycontemplated by Congress. Therefore in
imposingthe exclusion measure, as with respect to
the curfew, the Military Commande!' exercised discretion only with regard to "whether, under the
circumstances, the time and place wern approprincc for the promulgation of the * * * order
uud whether the order itself was an appropriate
means of carrying out the Executive Order for
the 'protection against espionage and against
sabotage' to national defense materials, premises
nud utilities." Hirabayashi v. United States, at p.
92. Further criteria of Jawful delegation, stated
in the Hirabayashi opinion, are also satisfied.
The Executive Order prescribed the standard of
protection against espionage and sabotage, which
Congressalso contemplated in enacting the statute,
to govem the actions of the military authorities.
'fhis standard was followed in determining upon
the Exclusion Order and Public Proclamation No.
I upon which it rested. Supr(L, p. 19. The legis.;
lative function was performed (Hirabayashi v.
United States, at p. 105) and the legislative will
was followed.

United States, 320 U.S. 81, 96-99.
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III
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT IN THE PRESENT CASE COXSIDER THE LAWFULNESS OF ANY DETENTION TO
WHICH PETITIONER WOULD HA VE BEEN SUBJECTED
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IF HE HAD ODEYED CIVILIAN EXCLUSION OHDEUNO. H

Those provisions of Civilian Exclusion Order
No. 34 of May 3, 1942 (infra, pp. 88-89), which
petitioner undertook to disregard, prescribed
that he be excluded from the local area in
which he lived and that it would be an offense for
him to be found there after . noon of May 9,
1942. The accompanying written Instructions referred to the provision of "temporary residence
elsewhere," to "evacuation" by the time stated in
the order, and to "departure for" and "transfer
to" the Assembly Center. They and the order
required that a responsible member of each family and each individual li".'ing alone report to a
Civil Control Station on either May 4 or May 5.
They also forbade changes of residence after noon
. on May 3. In challenging his allegedly threatened
"internment" and "imprisonment" (Pet. 8, 10),
petitioner contends in effect that the exclusion
feature of the order; even though in itself valid,
was so coupled with other measures to accomplish
the exclusion as to force him, if he should obeythe
order, to incur detriments which could not lawfully
be imposed upon him.
The Government does not dispute that petitioner, had he obeyed all of the provisions of the

---~~

order and the accompanying Instructions, would
have found himself •for a period
time, the
length of which was not then ascertainable, in a
place of detention. It does not follow that this
detention, which did not become actual; is an
issue in the present case. It was solely and
specifically petitioner's unlawful presence in the
urea which was charged in the information (R. 1).
His defense at the trial was no broader than this
diarge and no evidence was introduced by the Govt·rumcnt to meet wider issues. The majority at
least of the Circuit Court of Appeals (R. 33-35)
tonsidered the question to be simply the validity
of petitioner's exclusion from the defined area.
Petitioner was not accused or convicted of eluding detention or of not reporting for evacuation;
he was solely charged with remaining whe';re
he had no lawful right to be. His desire was to
stay there (R. 21). The only relevant question is
whether the provision of the order which forbade
his presence is valid. Had he submitted to evacuation, petitioner could have brought other proceedings to challenge his detention.
1. '1.'henarrow scope of the inf orm,ation precludes
cousidcration of prohibitions of the order not allegedto have been violated.-The prohibition of the
order which petitioner was accused of having
\·iolated was that which made it an • offense
for him to be "found in the above area after
• • * May 9, 1942,'' or, as stated in the
information, to "remain in that portion of Mil-
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itary Area No. 1 covered by Civilian Exclusion
Order No. 34 * * * after * * * May
9, 1942" (R. •1). He is not accused in this
proceeding of any other omission or conduct
or of violating any other phase of the ex·
clusion program. If, as we have already urged in
Points I and II, his exclusion from the designated
area was valid, he may not urge the Court to withdraw the legal means of enforcing this central military objective of the exclusion program by now
contending that if he had left the area independently he might either have been accused in some
other proceeding of having violated Public Proclamation No. 4 or other provisions of the order
and Instructions, or have found himself in physical
detention. If prosecution had resulted from his
independent action, he could have defended the
disobedience charged against him; if he had been
detained instead, habeas corpus would have been
available to test the validity of his detention. If,
on the other hand, petitioner had obeyed the
Civilian Exclusion Order in all respects, he could
have brought habeas corpus proceedings upon
reaching the Assembly Center. Whatever his
course, appropriate remedies were saved to him.
Petitioner's contention in striking at the provisions of the order which would have led to
detention, as an incident to his attack on the
sufficiency of the information, is in substance that
it was impossible to charge a violation of the order

basedupon bis remaining in the area. He contends
iu effect that he could not be accused of remaining
in the area without also involving other, allegedly
invalid parts of the order and Instructions and
that, even though the exclusion was valid, yet he
awl all others in similar circumstances could remain, because as means of accomplishing the exdusion the order laid out a course which would
have involved detention in an Assembly Center.
It seems clear that petitioner should not now be
pPrmitted to seek indirectly to nullify' the vital
military measure of exc_lusionof persons of J apalll'se ancestry from the "\Vest Coast area because
of the claimed invalidity of accompanying features
of the exclusion program. The exclusion was a
measure taken under the urgency of military
uecessity, based upon a threat of invasion, at a
critical point in the war. It would be a misapplication of the doctrine of inseparability, scarcely
consistent with the national security or welfare,
to hold that this measure may now be attacked, not
because of its own invalidity but because of the
alleged unconstitutionality of the means adopted
to effectuate it, when violation of these means is
not charged.
'rhis Court, in determining whether the constitutionality of a legislative provision may be
judged separately. from that of other provisions
which accompany it, has followed the criterion of
whether the particular provision, even though its

l
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requirements bear an administrative relationship
to the others, has an ''essential character and
to· stand alone.'' Electric
* * * capacity
• Bond &: Share Go. v. Securities and Exchange
Cornrnission, 303 U. S. 419, 437. See also Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Cornmission,286
U. S. 210, 234-235; Blackrner v. United States, 284
U. S. 421, 442. The rule that the validity of
the penal provisions of a statute will not be
•determined in a suit in which they are not involved, even though the suit requires detennination of the validity of other provisions which the
penal provisions were designed to •enforce, is a
familiar application of the foregoing principle.
Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107, 177; Ohio
Tax Gases, 232 U. S. 576, 594.
It is true that in the foregoing instances of application of the doctrine of separability the parties
seeking to challenge the separable provisions were
not subjected to actual disadvantage by reason of
the existence of these provisions, whereas petitioner was confronted with alternative courses of
action which involved either a violation of some
feature of the exclusion program or submission to
evacuation acc_ompaniedby detention. It does uot
follow from this, however, that petitioner became
entitled to raise the issues relating to detention in
this proceeding, which results from the alternative
he adopted. On the contrary, the issue is the one

.-clli'l~l~--

of exclusion, which responds to the charge in the

information and to the conduct in which he
engaged.18
2. This criminal case is in any event not an appropriate proceeding in which to attack the validity
of phases of the evacuation prograrn not involved
in pet-itioner's violation.-This Court bas recently
held in Yalcus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414, that
Congress way provide that one aggrieved by a
regulation of the Office of Price Administration
must promptly pursue an expedited statutory, administrative and civil remedy, and that if he omits
to <loso, be cannot thereafter question the lawfulness of the administrative order in a prosecutiofl:
for its violation, In Falbo v. United States, 320
In consequence of his violution, by urrangement sub:,('(1uentlymade, petitioner wus uctuully confined in an As~
Center. His custody was transferred from the civil to
1ie111bly
the militury authorities pending triul in the instant proceeding; und ho was on June 18, 1942, prior to the filing of his
taken by the military uuthorities to the T1mforan
1h•111uner,
.bsc111blyCenter. He was detuined there, except during his
attendance at tho trial, until he was sentenced on September
tl, 10-12.When he was placed on probution by the trial court
011 September 8, a term of the probution wus thut he should
comply with the orders respecting his evacuation and detention. Accordingly, he returned to the Tanforun Assembly
Center and was transferred on September' 26, 1942, from
there to the Centml Utuh Relocation Project. He was
grunted seasonal leave on November 21, 1942. This leave
wus extended several times and finally ·was, on his application, changed on February 4, 1944, to indefinite leave. Petitioner is now residing in Salt Luke City, Utah,
11

I

Reproduced at the National Archives at Seattle

,r.,

'•I

'I

~
i

...--

...

34

35

U. S. 549, it was held that one who was ordered
to report for assignment to work of national importance under the Selective Training and Service
Act must obey and may not, in a prosecution for
his failure to do so, defend on the ground that he
was erroneously classified by his Local Board in
a proceeding that was not fairly conducted. rrhe
Y alcus case, of course, rests upon an explicit statutory provision and the Falb·o decision involves, not
the alleged invalidity of a statute or general regulation, but the action of the authorities in an imlividual case. Nevertheless, both cases compel resort
to an appropriate alternative course of conduct,
precluding the defense of invalidity of administrative action in a prosecution for violation. An im-_
portant factor in both decisions was the strong
need of protecting vital governmental war operations against disregard of regulations and orders,
the invalidity of which had not been previously
established.
The availability of habeas corpus to the petitioner as an app1·opriate means of testing ilic
validity of any detention to which he might
have been subjected in connection with his evacuation, as well as afterward, cannot be doubted.
The courts were open to petitioner to seek a writ
of habeas corpus at any time. In this case, however,
petitioner was charged in a criminal proceeding,

and we do not urge that he is not entitled in such
proceeding to contend that his exclusion was inyulid.n Since, however, he would have had an
obrious means of testing the legality of a separable feature of the evacuation, namely the detention to which he might have been subjected, we
believe it .is proper to urge that this means
should be held to be exclusive.
,veighty consi'derations frequently enter into
judicial judgments with respect to the propriety of interferences by the courts with governmental processes, or • of adjudications afterward which would establish the invalidity of
1md1 processes. Some official acts, usually denominated "political," are totally immune from
judicial scrutiny. Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
Oregon, 223 U. S. 118; Dodd, Judicially Nonenforceable Provisions of Constitutions (1931), 80
U. Pa. L. Rev. 54, 84, 1 Selected Essays on Constitutional Law 355, 387. With others, including the
t-aleof property seized by the Government during
wartime as enemy-owned (Stoehr v. Wallace, 255
'"Supra, pp. 29-33. Suit to restrain enforcement of the
Exclusion Or<ler might well, under nil tho circumstances,
h,1,·c been met with a discretionary determination by tho
rnurt tlmt, however grent tho prospective loss to tho petitioner, the court should not undertake to interfere with a
militury operation. For a summary of tho applicnble doctri11essee 4 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (4th ed., 1919),
t-'l'CS. 1750-1751.
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U. S. 239, 245-246), the courts decline to
interfere through preventive decrees or writs
(Myers v. Bethlehem, Shipbuilding Gorp., 303
U. S. 41; Newport News Shipbuilding & Drydock
Co. v. Schau.ffler, 303 U. S. 54; Federal Communications Com:mission v. Pottsville Broadcasting Go., 309 U. S. 134) 20 or through withhholtliJJg
authorized judicial aid to administrative proceedings during their course. Endicott Johnson Corp.
v. Perkins, 317 U. S. 501. Closely allied are the
cases which refuse judicial review of administrative acts until administrative remedies have been
exhausted (Gorham Mfg. Go. v. State 'l.'ax Commiss-ion, 266_U. S. 265, 269-270; Myers v. Betltlehem, Shipbuilding Gorp., supra, at pp. 50-51) or
compel resort to appropriate administrative proceedings in preference to parallel judicial remedies. Texas & Pacific Ry. Go. v . .Abilene Cotto11
Oil Go., 204 U. S. 426; compare Brown Lumber
Go. v. L. & N. R. Co., 299 .U. S. 393.
The consequences for the future of holding in
this case that disobedience of the exclusion order
was a proper means of testing its validity might
be grave. It is quite apparent that evacuation of
the Japanese population from the Pacific Coast,
Especially delicate questions are presented when a Federal court is asked "to enjoin state action, and judicial selfdoniiil is correspondingly greater, even as agninst a claim
of threatened Wlconstitutional action. Matthews v. Rodger,,
284 U. S. 521 (injunction against collection of allegedly unconstitutional state tax held improper even though sole state
remedy wus action to recover taxes paid und_er protest) i
Douglas v. Jeannette, 319 U. S. 157.
20

:

37

deemed vitally necessary by the Military Commander,would have been frustrated if disobedience
bud been general. We submit that the basic ratio
of the Falbo and Y alcus cases is that there
dt"Cidcndi
are times wh~n it is necessary for the Govermnent
to act first and litigate afterward, with respect to
emergencymatters which can fairly be determined
in that manner. The corollary is that the citizen
mustobey and then seek bis remedy; and if he fails
to obeyhe cannot be relieved of the consequences of
di:ml>edience.If there are such times, surely the
spring of 1942 on the Pacific Coast was one; and the
i~ue of detention in the_course of evacuation could
well await litigation not precipitated by disobedienceto the exclusion itself.
3. 1'/ierelocation phase of the exclusion program
is 11otinvolved in tht'.s case.-lt is· clear in any
ern1t that this proceeding does not involve any
tl1·tentionto which •evacuees have been subjected
since the time of petitioner's violation as a means
of furthering their fmal relocation rather than as
a method of securing their removal from the West
Coast area to Relocation Centers. We have contrntled that none of the detention of evacuees
which has been involved in the exclusion program
is properly in issue in this case; for the issue
framed by the information does not embrace it, no
evidencerelating to it was introduced at the trial,
aud more appropriate proceedings have at all times
been available whereby petitioner could have challengedthe detention, had he wished to do so. Even
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No. 8 of June 27, 1942 (infra, pp. 94-97). In the
mt•antimeCivilian Restrictive Order No. 2 of May
:W,1942(infra, p. 69) inaugurated the agricultural
work g~·oupprogram for some of those in the AssemblyCenters. Civilian Restrictive Orders Nos.
~t1md 7, issued prior to May 30, 1942 (infra, p. 70),
rt·sultedin the temporary release of a limited mun.on of evacuees, including a ·few of those at Tanforan, and some of these releases were later made
Jil'l'lllanent (infra, p. 74). The War Relocation
Authority's program for the indefinite release of
inhabitants of Relocation Centers came into actual
operation August 11, 1942, when authority to issue
such releases was conferred upon it (infra, p. 72).
In view of this history, it cam1ot be asserted upon
any realistic basis that petitioner's violation could
have been motivated by a desire to avoid detention
other than that in an Assembly Center or that any
other detention need in fact have occurred in his
case had he obeyed the Exclusion Order. The relocationphase of the exclusion program, including
the detention of evacuees in Relocation Centers, is
a separate aspect of the whole program, which was
not present in a definite sense in the situation that
confronted petitioner at the time of his ·violation.
If detention in a Relocation Center had later come
to apply to him, he could, of course, have brought
habeas corpus to_ challenge its continuance. Ex
parte Endo, No. 70, this Tenn. So hypothetical an
issue, as respects petitioner, is not present in this
case.
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if this contention is wrong and petitioner should
be held to be entitled to call in question the detention which attended the removal of the evacuees
and compelled their residence in Assembly Centers
pending more permanent provision for them, he
cannot seek to avoid his conviction by attacking
a still later phase of the exclusion program which
had not developed at the time of his violation and
to which he might not have been subjected.
Petitioner could not have known at the time he
disregarded Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34 by
failing to report for evacuation on May 9, 1942,
that detention in a Relocation Center, of indefinite
_duration, might follow detention in an Assembly
Center if he should comply; nor is it certain that
in his case it would have. On May 30, 1942,the
date of the offense which is charged in the informa• tion, Civilian Restrictive Order No. 1 of May 19,
1942, (·infra, pp. 93-94), which required persons of
Japanese ancestry residing in Relocation Centers
to remain there, gave notice that detention outside
an Assembly Center was possible. Not until May
26, 1942, however, were any evacuees actually trans·
ferred from Assembly to Relocation Centers
(-infra, p. 70); and none of those from the Tan·
foran Center, to which petitioner would almost
certainly have been taken, were moved until September of that year (supra, p. 9). 'l'he War Relocation Authority was created l\farch 18, 1942; but
the program of Relocation Centers was not given
permanent sanctions until Public Proclamation
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port,p.107. 'I1heProclamation precipitated a rush

·1: ')

of registrations for self-aITanged evacuation, but it
jg not known how many persons carried out their
intention to leave during the two days following
the issuance of the Proclamation, before its prohibition of further migration became effective. There
wus no further opportunity given for the persons
affected throughout Military Area No. 1 to leave
under their own arrangements or, in the alter22
native, enter reception centers voluntarily.
As bas been stated (supra, p. 7), Civilian Exclusion Order No. 1, applicable to a small territory
in the State of _Washington, permitted self-arranged migration during the five days following
its promulgation on March 24, 1942. The order
applied to 258 persons, none of ·whom took advantage of the opportunity to migrate. Instead,
these persons were taken to Assembly and later to
Relocation Centers. Final Report, pp. 49, 363.
Thereafter the Civilian Exclusion Orders followed
the pattern embodied in Civilian Exclusion Order
No. 34, which petitioner violated. Supra, p. 7.
'rhe inadequacy of self-arranged migration to
accomplish the removal of persons of Japanese
ancestry was caused partly by. fear on tlieir part
of violence wl~ich their migration to the interior
might have precipitated. 'l'his situation demonstrated, according to General DeWitt, that

,."

CONNECTION WITH HIS EVACUATION HAD RE OBEYED
EXCLUSION ORDER, WOULD HAVE HF.SULT.El>
FROM REGULATIONS COMING Wl'l'HIN THE WAIi
THE

POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS

1. The decision to accompany exclusion with the
detention of evacuees pending their relocation was
'made after other methods had been e1nployedw,successfully.-The basic considerations which ledto
the substitution of controlled evacuation for
self-arranged migration, so far as information
'is available, are referred to above, at pp.13-14. One
reason was the failure of self-arranged migration to accomplish the removal from the
West Coast area of any considerable number
of persons of Japanese ancestry. Not until Public Proclamation No. 4 ( infra, pp. 86-87) had
been promulgated on March 27, 1942, and had
given notice of the termination of self-arranged migration and of the inauguration of group eyacuation was there any considerable movement on the
part of persons of Japanese ancestry to the interior.
Of the net total of 4,889 such persons who left lililitary Areas Nos. 1 and 2 pursuant to their own arrangements (infra, p. 63), only 2,005 reported their
intention to leave Military Area No. 1 before the
issuanc\3 of Public Proclamation No. 4. Final Re-

Previously, on Murch 21, 10421 a group of 2,100 persons,
recruited from the Los Angeles area, went voluntarily to
the Manzanur Assembly Center. to assist in its completion.
•
FiMl Report, p. 48.
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1F THE QUESTION IS PRESENTED, THE DETEN'l'IONTO
WHICH PETITIONER WOULD HA VE BEEN SUBJECTEDIN
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23
"Prior to March 12" when the Wartime Civil Control
Administration was established, however, "it was hoped that
the evacuation would be characterized primarily by a voluntary exodus." Two reception centers were planned for tho
ton;iporary accommodation of those who wore unable to pro•
vide for themselves or who declined to leave until forcc<lto
do so. These were intended to have a capacity of 10,000persons each. Final Rep01·t, p. 44. It was specifically stute<lin
earlier documents that the provision of shelter by the Army
would be for only those evacuees whose resettlement was not
arranged through their own efforts or those of private ugcn•
cies. Memorandum of February 20, 1942, from Assistm1t
Secretary of War John J. McCloy to General DeWitt,
printed in the Final Report, at p. 20. Geneml De Witt's own
Final Recommendations with respect to the evacuation,
dated February 14, envisaged tempornry voluntary intern·
ment under guard, followed by resettlement, for those Japanese-American citizens who would accept it, with oxclu•
sion from the Military Areas and some public assistance for
those who would not. Japanese aliens were to be subjected
to compulsory internment. Final Report, at p. 37.

The reasons for the decision to terminate selfarranged migration from Military Area No. 1
011 March 29, 1942 are stated to have been "First,
• • * to alleviate tension and prevent incide~ts_
:nYolving violence between Japanese migrants
nutl others" and "Second, * * * to insure
nu orderly, supervised, and thoroughly controlled
evacuation with adequate provision for the pro-.
tcction of the persons of evacuees as well as their
property." (Final Report, p. 105.)
Essentially, military necessity required
only that the Japanese population be removed from the coastal area and dispersed
•
in the interior,
where the danger of action
in concert during any attempted enemy
raids along the coast, or in advance thereof
as preparation for a full scale attack, would
be eliminated. 'l'hat the evacuation program necessarily and ultimately developed
into one of complete Federal· supervision,
was due primarily to the fact that the interior states would not accept an uncontrolled Japanese migration. (Final Report,
pp. 43-44.)
In contrast to the lack of effective provision
for the migrants which characterized the self-arranged migration, the evacuation to Assembly
Centers provided "shelter and messing facilities
and the minimwn essentials for the maintenance
of health and morale." Final Report,· p. 78.
Further information concerning the Assembly
Centers is given infra, p. 68.
:18-1070-4-1-
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"voluntary migration would be but one phase
of the over-all program-never
a complete and
satisfactory solution.'' Neve}.'theless voluntary
migration "was encouraged and assisted . * * •
until such time as it became clearly evident'' that
it "was creating major social and economic
problems in the areas to which the Japanese were
moving." Final Report, p. 101.23 Those who
responded to the encouragement were mainly
those "with some financial independence or
with relatives and friends in the area of destination." Only $10,200 in all were expended prior
to June_ 5, 1942, in assisting 125 individuals and
families-92 during the period of "voluntary evacuation"-who applied for such aid. Idem, p. 10-1.
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tary of War or the said Military Commander,
and until other arrangements are made, to accomplish the purpose of this order" ( infra, p.
77). Criminal penalties for the violation of
regulations with respect to the right to "enter,
11.•mainin, leave, or commit any act in any
u;ilitary area or µiilitary zone prescribed unde;i.the authority of an Executive order of the
President, by the Secretary of War, or by any
military commander designated by the Secretary of War, contrary to the restrictions applicable to any such area or zone or contrary to
the order of the Secretary of War or any such
military commander" were specifically authorized
by the Act (infra, p. 78).
• If the detention of evacuees was within the
Executive Order, it was within the Act for reasons
already stated and approved by this Court in the
llirabayashi case (supra, pp.19-20). Whether detention was within the Order depends (1) upon
the terms of the Order, just recited, which support
it, and. (2) upon the relation of detention to the
purpose sought to be accomplished, including the
evacuation which, as this Court has stated, was
specifically envisaged by Congress at the time the
Act was passed. Hirabayashi v. United States,
• 320U.S. 81, at pp. 90-91.
'l'hG hasic, expressed purpose of Executive
Order No. 9066 was to authorize '' every possible
}>l'otectionagainst espionage and against sabotage
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2. The detention to which petitioner might have
been subj'ected came within the authorization of
Executive Order No. 9066 and the Act of March
21, 1942.-The detention in question, viewed as of
the time of petitioner's violation, was of w1certain
duration in an Assembly Center. It had become
apparent by May 30, 1942 that further evacuation
would be to Relocation Centers, but the duration
of further detention and the methods of securing
release were not yet known, except that temporary release for agricultural work was possible.
(Supra, pp. 38-39).
Executive Order No. 9066 pro"\i'ides that, with
respect to the military areas authorized to be
prescribed, "the right of any person to enter,
remain in, or leave shall be subject to whatever
restrictions the Secretary of War or the appropriate Military Commander may impose in his
discretion." '11his Order also authorizes "the
Secretary of War and the * * * Military
Commanders to take such other steps as he or
the appropriate Military Commander may deem
advisable to enforce compliance with the restrictions applicable to each Military area hereinabove
authorized to be designated including the use of
Federal troops and other Federal Agencies,"
as well as "to provide for residents of any such
area who are excluded therefrom, such transportation, food, shelter, and other accommodations
as may be necessary, in the judgment of the Secre--
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• to national-defense material, national-defense
premises, and national-defense• utilities." 'l'he
finding that the requirements of' Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34.were necessary for this purpose
was made by references in the Exclusion Order
and in Public Proclamation No. 4 to Public Proclamation No. 1 which had established :Military
Area No. 1 after reciting the danger of espionage
and sabotage in connection with a threatened invasion (-infra, p. 66). rrhe adequacy of such a
reference to Public Proclamation No. 1, containing the requisite findings, was dete1111inedby this
Court in llirabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S.
81, at p. 103. In Public ~roclamation No. 4 it was
found, in addition, that "it is necessary, in order
to provide for the welfare and to insure the orderly
evacuation and resettlement of Japanese voluntarily migrating from Military Area No. 1, .torestrict and regulate such migration."
The detention in Assembly Centers, consequently, was a means of accomplishing the evacuation and of mitigating the harmful consequences
of the exclusion which was ordered for the purpose of preventing espionage and sabotage on the
West Coast. Hence the detention was a collateral
measure closely related to the exclusion and, as
such, came within the purpose as well as the
literal terms of Executive Order No. 9066. If
Congress understood that the Executive Order,
which it ratified, authorized measures to deal with
the consequences of the evacuation which was en-

,·isaged, these measures came also within ~he Act
of March 21, 1942. • It is not to be doubted that
Congress conferred upon the military authorities
in exercising their powers, the authority to execute
them with reasonable regard to the conditions that
might be precipitated by the measures they were
directed to take.
3. Assurning that detention as a concomitant to
et·aczwtionwas within Executive Order No. 9066
aud the Act of March 21, 1942, the authority to
drcide ·n1JOn
it was not unconstitutionally delegated
to the ni£litary authorities.-lt is not necessary to
consider whether the President, acting alone, could
have issued or authorized the detention orders;
for his action in promulgating Executive Order
906Gwas ratified by Congress. The question is
whether Congress and the Executive, acting toj!l'ther, could leave it to the designated Military
Commander to appraise the relevant conditions
und on the basis of that appraisal to detennine
~,poua method of evacuation involving detention,
as an appropriate means of carrying out the
Order. Ilirabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S.
81, 92.
The question is somewhat different from that
surrounding the delegation of authority to prescribe curfews and the evacuation itself, both of
which were specifically contemplated by Congress
when it adopted the Act of March 21, 1942 (Hira,,.
bayashi case, at pp. 91, 102). The discretion con-
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powers, which this ·Court has ieeognized as
proper (United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp.,
:!!J!I U. S. 304, 319-322; Hirabayashi •v. United
Stales, 320 U. S. 81, 104), we submit.- that the
lll'h•gation of authority to prescribe measures
rl'asouably found to be necessary to guard against
consequences, harmful to the war effort, which
mi~ht result from the exercise of powers undoubtedly conferred by the Act, was not unconstitut ioual.2' Under such a delegation there is not
"an absence of standards for the guidance"· of
administrative action, such as would make it
"impossible in a proper proceeding to ascertain
whether the will of Congress has been obeyed''
n11d alone would justify this Court in overriding
the choice by Congress "of means for effecting
its declared purpose." Yalcus v. United States,
J:!1 U. S. 414, 426. A court can determine
whether given measures are related to the prewntion of espionage and sabotage and to a
specificallyauthorized exclusion.
4. 'l'he detention of evacuees in an Assembly
Centeras a concomitant to their removal is within
the scope of the war power and is consistent with
due process of law.-The detention here in question, as previously pointed out (supra, p. 44), is
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• "Where the orders
under the present Act have some
rdution to 'protection nguinst espionage and against
sul>ouige',our task is ut an end." Concurring opinion of
~[r. Justice Douglas in_ Hfrahayashi v. United States, 320
U. S. ut p. 106.
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ferred with respect to both these measures related
solely to whether, when, and where they should
be applied. The authority to impose detention
•
'
on the other hand, .involved a choice of measures
not specifically contemplated but falling within
the stated general purpose, as well as a judgment
of whether, when, and where to act.
The question, of course, is whether the provisions of the Act of March 21, 1942, if understood to afford a basis for the temporary detention
of evacuees from a military area,. are sufficiently
definite to provide a standard which prevents
the delegated power from being legislative
in the constitutional sense. In determining this
question the provisions of· Executive Order
No. 9066 and Public Proclamations Nos. 1
and 2, as well as those of the Act itself, may
be considered, since all were approved by Con·
gress (Hira.bayashi case, at pp. 91, 102-103).
These provisions, as previously noted, establish
the prevention of espionage and sabotage as the
purpose of the measures which are authorized.
Exclusion was specifically authorized and tlie
Order authorized such steps as the Military
Commander might deem advisable to enforce com}Jliance with the restrictions that might be imposed and as might be required to provide for
persons excluded from an area (supra, p.4"/).
In the light of the breadth of the delegations of
authority, coming under the war power and related
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Petitioner did not seek to show, by evidence
or otherwi:se,that detention in Assembly Centers
ns a method of accomplishing the evacuation was
uot i-casonablY,appropriate to the basic purpose
of exclusion. The alternative which his position
sccrnsto suggest is that the evacuation, although
compulsoryand to be accomplished quickly, should
uot have been accompanied by any restraint; that
the thousands of families and individuals who
Wl'l'C involved should have been required to leave
their homes in the restricted areas with such
assistance as they might voluntarily accept. The
n•$ultmight have been a great mass movement of
the persons affected, by all possible means of transpurtation, or without transportation, entailing
great hardship and confusion, and with continued
if not increased danger of espionage and sabotage
whichit was the purpose of the whole program to
nvert. rrhe result, further, might have been the
nrrival of many individuals in communities unreceptive to them and without provision for them.
It could not have been known when or where they
wouldarrive and under what conditions.
The Assembly Center was reasonably calculated
nt least to mitigate these hardships and also to
avoid the dangers which lay behind the decision
to require evacuation. The constitutional validity
of the restraint of liberty entailed by the Assembly
Center must be .judged in relation to the reason-
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detention in an Assembly Center until such time 118
further provision for the evacuees might be made,
which was determined upon as an essential
measure in connection with the exclusion.
It should be stressed that the Assembly Centers
provided temporarily for the evacuees and have
long since served their purpose. Such centers
no longer exist. Evacuees first entered an Assembly Center on March 31, 1942. During the
following months these centers received persons
of Japanese ancestry, old men and women, family
groups, young men and women, and children of
various ages. The 14 Assembly Centers provided
in all for 92,193 persons (infra, p. 74). They were
supplied with doctors, dentists, nurses, hospitals
and temporaiy facilities for the care and maintenance of the evacuees during the period required
for the construction and equipment of more
permanent Relocation Centers which were being
made ready with all possib_lespeed. The Relocation Centers were to be places of more extended
residence while the program of relocation in
normal communities was being worked out by the
Government. The Assembly Centers, accordingly,
were an intermediate phase of the program between evacuation and transfer to Relocation
Centers. All evacuees had) been transferred by •
•November, 1942, and no one has since been detained
in an Assembly Center.
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actual threats against evacuees. Tl\ese are said to
have numbered "several thousand."
(P. 106.) 211
'fhe judgment of the military authorities is confirmed by that of the Tolan Committee. Reporting on May 13, that Committee stated:
Voluntary settlement outside of prohibited and restricted areas has been com- .
plicated, if not made impossible for an
indefinite period, by the resentment of
communities to, what appeared to them, an
influx of people so potentially dangerous •
to our national security as to require their
removal from strategic milita1y areas.
'l'he statement was repeated again and
again, by communities outside the military
areas, "We don't want these people in our
State. If they are not good enough for
California, they are not good enough
for us.mo
In addition, the need of providing adequately for
the evacuees during the difficult period of physical
transfer to new locations and of readjustment to
'~The National Secretary of the Jnpnnese-American Citi-.
wusLeague testified before the Tolnn Committee on February·
:!;J,10-12,that "in view of the alarming developments • • •
all pluns for voluntary evacuations" should be discouraged.
Hearings, Part 29, p. 11137. On March 21, in advance of
compulsorymigrution, 2,100 persons had been recruited from
LosAngeles to proceed in a conduct~d grnup to the Manzunar
.\.s.-;embly
Center, which was
still under construction. Supra,
p.-11.
• Fourth Interim Report, p. 17. Early instances of hostility on the West Coast itself are referred to in the testin1011y of witnesses before the Committee.
Hearings, Part
29, pp. 11137,11156.
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ableness of the basic purpose and the means available for its execution.
The question involves
the validity of a particular method adopted for
carrying out an exclusion which was itself justified by factors of common know ledge.
Petitioner, in challenging the method used,
labors under a heavy burden, particularly when,
in the posture which the case has assumed, a decision in accordance with his contention would
strike down not only the method adopted but also,
.in practical effect, the exclusion itself. For if
petitioner was wrongfully convicted because detention in an Assembly Center would have resulted
from full obedience to t?e order, and if he could
not validly be convicted, as he was, of violating
only that f~ature of the order which prohibited his
remaining in the area, then the exclusion, as ordered,
was unenforceable by legal means.
Petitioner has not borne the burden which
rested upon him. 'l'he indications of hostility to
the evacuees, which lay at the basis of the decision
to impose detention (supra, pp. 41-43), have not
been negatived. The belief of the military authorities in the danger of violence has not been
shown to have been unreasonable. The existence of that belief is undisputed. The Final Report of General De Witt states that "widespread.
hostility'' -had developed "in ahnost every state
and every community. It was literally unsafe for
Japanese migrants"
(pp. 104-105). The report refers to "one example among many" of
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new conditions argued for a controlled migration.
Undoubtedly the Government bore a heavy responsibility to the people whom it was uprooting
from their homes and accustomed means of livelihood-a responsibility which it was justified in
taking strong measures to meet, even at the cost
of temporarily restraining the liberty of the
evacuees. The needs of the evacuees confrontiug
the military authorities and the appropriateness
of the measures adopted to meet these needs, like
the danger of violence, were affirmed by the Tolau
Committee in the following language:
While apparent l'espect for the rights of
citizens prompted an early disposition to
permit voluntary relocation outside prohibited areas, the seemingly insurmount• able obstacles to such a program has led to
ru1 emphasis on Federal responsibility for
resettlement. Only under a Federal program, providing for financial assistance,
protection to person· and property and
an opportunity to engage in productive
work, did it appear possible to mi_nimizc
injustice. 21
It may properly be urged, in addition, that the
primary purpose of the evacuation, namely the
prevention of espionage and_sabotage, would have
suffe1'i(!<las a 1·esult of confusion, disorder, and
_i-esentmentflowing from an uncontrolled migration
of 100,000 persons. As this Court recognized in
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S. at p. 99,
27

Fourth Interim Report, p. 17.

there ,vns reason to believe that a disloyal minority
existedamong the evacuees. Its size and the iden28
To force
tity of its members were not known.
this group suddenly into the interior upon its own
resources might well have been to shift the locale
of the danger _0£espionage and sabotage without
eliminating it. Although the same danger might
have been present to some degree had the selfarranged migration, which preceded the enforced
evacuation, been more su~cessful than it was
(supra,pp. 41-42), the danger would certainly have
Lt·en at its maximum if an uncontrolled mass
2
t·vacuationhad been ordered. u
,. As of July 29, 1944, it had been determined by tho War
H,•locutionAuthority after hearing that 1,200 citizens un<l328
11licnsamong tho evacuees were disloyal or of sufficiently
Juubtful loyalty to warrant tho denial of leave to depart
from Relocation Centers for the bulunce of. tho war with
Jupun. The cases of 792 inclividuals remained to bo determinl'd. These have been seg1·egnteclat tho Tule Lake Relof11tionCenter, together with approximately 10,000 others,
t"itizl'nand alien, who have applied for repatriation to Japan
11ndwho failed to answer or gave unsatisfactory answers to
luyulty questions included in a questionnaire subrnittecl to
thl•entire evacuee population in February and March, 1943,
anti members of the families of all of these. During 1942
uml l!J.13,365 evacuees were repatriated. to J apnn by their
own desire, as a result of exchange arrangements with the
Jupunese Government. Final Peport, pp. 309-328. For
further information concerning the evacuee group and the
progrum of segregation of the disloyal and the release of
others see the Government's brief in E::r,parte Endo, No. 70,
this Term.
11
This danger is not referred to in official reports upon the
evucuationas it was actually conducted. That it should have
received consideration in the light of other factors relied
upon seems evident, however.
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The detention of persons, whether citizens or
aliens, in the interest of the public safety or their
own welfare or both, apart from punishment for
the commission of offenses, is a measure not infrequently adopted by government.ao The arrest
and detention of persons suspected of crime but pre.
swned to be innocent, with 1·eleasedependent upon
ability to furnish bail, are of daily occurrence, with
resulting hardships to blameless victims perhaps
comparable in a year's time in the United States
to the mental and spiritual sufferings of the Japanese evacuees. See National Commission on Law
Observance and Enforcement, Report on Penal Institutions, Probation and Parole (1931): Report
of the Advisory Gmnniittee, at pp. 271-27!J;
Hutcheson, The Local Jail, 21 A. B. A. J. 81 (1935).
The d~tention of jurors (State v. Netherton, 128
Kan. 564, 279 Pac. 19), and of material witnesses
,whose disappearance is feared ( United States v.
Von Bonini, 24 F. Supp. 867 (S. D. N_.Y.)) is a
related phenomenon. Even ·apart from the emergency of war, but during a proclaimed state of
the detention of individuals by
"insurrection",
30

Those ufllicted by mental disorder or communicable disease may of course be restrained (Ew parte Lewis, 328 :Mo.
843, 42 S. \V. (2d) 21), und the classes of persons subject to
such restraint may be enlarged to accord with developing
medical knowledge or social conditions. Minnesota v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270. Carriers of u disease, even though
not themselves suffering from its effects, may be restrained
for as long us the public health requires. People ea:rel. B(ll'rnore v. Robin.son, 302111.422, 134 N. E. 815.

executiveaction in the interest of order, the courts
beingopen to afford a remedy to persons seeking to
rhallcngetheir detention, has been sustained by this
Court. Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U. S. 78. Cf.
8iati11g v. Constantin, 287 U. S. 3781 400.
'l'lJCeffect of a war in empowering the Government to impose restraints which might be invalid
in nomml times has often been noted. Block v.
Hirsch,256 U.S. 135, 150-156; Meyer v. Nebraska,
:!ti2U. S. 390, 402; H·irabayashi v .. United States,
3~0U.S. 81, 93; ;Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S.
-U-l,443. And the war power extends to measures
for dealing with the consequences of war in the
sodal and economic order as well as to measures
designed to aid in carrying force to the enemy.
Stcu~art v. Kahn, 11 Wall. 493; Raymond v.
Thomas,91 U. S. 712; Hamilton v. Kentucky Dis"tilleries Co., 251 U. S. 146. Both as a means of
forestalling possible espionage or sabotage and as
u 1i1ctbodof meeting conditions precipitated by the
l·xclusionof persons of Japanese ancestry from
the \Vest Coast, therefore, the controlled evacuation and the detention which it enfailed were a
,·alidexercise of the war power.
In essence, the. military judgment that was required in determining upon a program for tlie
evacuation was one with regard to tendencies and
probabilities as evidenced by attitudes, opinions,
and slight experience, rather than a conclusion based upon objectively ascertainable facts.
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the exclusion itself; that the validity of the use of
AssemblyCenters is not here in issue; and that
there is no occasion for lJ. decision with respect to
n phnseof the exclusion program long since ended.
The validity of continued restraint in Relocation
Centers, where many of the evacuees now are, is
involvedin Ex parte Endo, No. 70, this Term, and·
is, we understand, to be heard and considered with
t!Jepresent case.
CONCLUSION

l

'·
Reproduced at the National Archives at Seattle

"There was neither pattern nor precedent for an
rmdertaking of this magnitude and character"," at
least in this country. Impairment of personal
liberty resulted from the decision that was made.
It cannot be said, however, even with the benefit
of hindsight, that the decision was clearly umeasonable under the circumstances. That being so,
it came within the purview of the war power exercised to accomplish the exclusion and did not
violate due process of law. To the extent that the
consequential detention in an Assembly Center can
be questioned in this case, the conclusion shoul<l
be that the impairment of liberty which was entailed resulted from the use of measures responsibly and reasonably calculated to further a validly
inaugurated program based on military necessity.
It is of some significance that not a single person of the thousands detained in Assembly Centers
sought release by habeas corpus although, as previously stated, the courts were at no time closed
to them. Petitioner alone has challe1iged the
Assembly Center and does so, not as one actually
subjected to its restraint, but in a criminal proceeding in which the only charge against him is
that he remained in a military area after he had
been forbidden to •do so. We accordingly revert
to our basic position, that the ground of the
decision in this case should be only the validity of
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In view of the fore~oing considerations, we
respectfully submit that petiti~ner's conviction
and the judgment of the court b_elowshould be
affirmed.
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Letter of transmittal, Final Report of General DeWitt,
p. viii.
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